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THE GOVERNMENT’S MANUFACTURE OF DOUBT
Helen Norton*
“The manufacture of doubt” refers to a speaker’s
strategic efforts to undermine factual assertions that threaten its
self-interest. This strategy was perhaps most famously
employed by the tobacco industry in its longstanding campaign
to contest the mounting medical evidence that linked cigarettes
to serious health conditions.1 At its best, the government’s
speech can counter such efforts and protect the public interest,
as exemplified by the Surgeon General’s groundbreaking 1964
report on the dangers of tobacco, a report that challenged the
industry’s preferred narrative.2 But the government’s speech is
not always so heroic, and governments themselves sometimes
seek to manufacture doubt and protect their own interest at the
expense of the public’s.3
In this short Essay, I examine how the government as
speaker sometimes seeks to manufacture doubt about factual
assertions it perceives as inconsistent with its policy or partisan
preferences. I start with some background on the history of
government speech in the United States, a history that reveals
the diversity and complexity of the government’s expressive
choices. Drawing from historical and contemporary examples, I
then identify at least three strategies through which the
government sometimes seeks to manufacture doubt: through its
lies and misrepresentations, through its attacks on individuals
and institutions that challenge its preferred narrative, and
*

Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of
Colorado School of Law. Thanks to Hannah Armentrout and Katherine Struthers
for excellent research assistance, and to the participants at the “Distorting the Truth:
‘Fake News’ and Free Speech” symposium at the University of North Carolina
School of Law for thoughtful comments.
1
See NAOMI ORESKES AND ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE
TO GLOBAL WARMING 33–34 (2010) (“[T]he tobacco industry knew the dangers of
smoking as early as 1953 and conspired to suppress the knowledge. They conspired
to fight the facts, and to merchandise doubt. . . . The industry defended its primary
product—tobacco—by manufacturing something else: doubt about its harm.”).
2
See generally, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, No. 1103, SMOKING
AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GEN. OF THE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERV. (1964) (describing the adverse health effects of smoking).
3
These strategies are neither new nor unique to American governments. See Amanda
Taub, ‘Kompromat’ and the Danger of Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2017, at A3
(“[K]ompromat is more than an individual piece of damaging information: It is a
broader attempt to manufacture public cynicism and confusion in ways that target
not just one individual but an entire society. . . . By eroding the very idea of a shared
reality, and by spreading apathy and confusion among a public that learns to distrust
leaders and institutions alike, kompromat undermines a society’s ability to hold the
powerful to account and ensure the proper functioning of government.”).
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through its choices to bury or deny access to information that it
finds inconvenient or dangerous. I close by briefly considering
possible responses to these strategies.
I. SOME BACKGROUND ON THE GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE
CHOICES
In this Part, I very briefly sketch the variety and
complexity—as well as the pervasiveness—of the government’s
expressive choices. For example, when we discuss government
speech, we often focus on presidential expression. But
legislative and judicial branch speakers—as well as speakers
from all levels of federal, state, and local governments —also
deserve our attention and, at times, our concern. The
government’s audiences are similarly diverse: they include not
only the American public but also our foreign allies, neutrals,
and enemies. They include other government speakers as well;
indeed, separation of powers and federalism principles in great
part seek to force different government actors to talk with each
other.4 The full range of the government’s expressive choices is
also broad, and includes not only its affirmative speech—such
as the substance, tone, and delivery of its debates, dialogue, and
counterspeech—but also its silences.5
Over time, governmental speakers have made very
different decisions about how to deploy these expressive
possibilities. With respect to presidential speech, for example,
historian Jeffrey Tulis explains that “[t]he rhetorical presidency
4

See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 91 (1983) (“In Madisonian fashion,
powerful communicators should be played off against one another, preventing any
one group or elite from gaining ideological dominance. Governments should be
pitted against one another in the wars of words and symbols, and government
communications generally should be subject to the counterforce of communications
emanating from a healthy, diverse, and pluralistic private sector.”).
5
Here I distinguish the government’s “silences” from its “secrets.” Governmental
secrets generally involve the government’s decision not to disclose certain facts. See
infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. By governmental silences, in contrast, I
mean the government’s failure to speak on a contested public policy issue or crisis.
For examples of such governmental silences, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF
MASSIVE RESISTANCE 63 (1969) (“Eisenhower was later to state in his memoirs that
the Supreme Court’s judgment in the desegregation cases was unquestionably
correct. During his years in office, however, the President failed to express publically
his approval either of the principle enunciated in the Brown decision or of the ruling
itself. Since the racial question was the dominant domestic issue of the period, he
made many comments on the subject. Yet not once did he endorse the desegregation
decision or offer support to those struggling to implement its provisions. ‘I do not
believe,’ the President reiterated, ‘it is the function or indeed it is desirable for a
President to express his approval or disapproval of any Supreme Court decision.’”);
GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW FROM
AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 259 (2017) (describing
President Reagan’s reluctance to engage AIDS as a public health crisis).
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and the understanding of American politics that it signifies are
twentieth-century inventions and discoveries. Our pretwentieth-century polity proscribed the rhetorical presidency as
ardently as we prescribe it.”6 Indeed, the Framers feared that
charismatic speakers posed grave threats to a democratic state,7
and thus sought to limit such speakers’ power and influence
through norms of discourse along with structural constraints.8
Starting with George Washington and continuing through most
of the 19th century, for example, presidents expressed
themselves primarily through written communications that
offered greater formality and opportunity for reflection; along
these lines, Jefferson began a tradition of sending his
assessment of the State of the Union to Congress in writing,
rather than through an oral address he felt more appropriate for
a monarch.9 Similarly, Andrew Jackson “made his arguments
to the people in the form of official statements such as his
annual messages and the Nullification Proclamation, rather
than by giving speeches. This formalized process allowed
presidential positions on the Constitution to be fully vetted with
advisors and crafted for widespread consumption.”10
Abraham Lincoln serves as the exemplar of thoughtful
and restrained presidential rhetoric, largely preferring “to
address the people through the press without the intervention of
editors . . . .”11 Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, provides
the exception that demonstrates the rule, as Johnson routinely
engaged in direct and informal appeals to the public that struck

6

JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 5–7 (1987).
See James W. Ceaser, Demagoguery, Statesmanship, and Presidential Politics, in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY 251 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey K. Tullis eds.,
2009) (“The Federalist is filled with grave warnings against flattery and against the
‘artful misrepresentations of interested men’ who encourage the people to indulge
‘the tyranny of their own passions.’”); TULIS, supra note 6, at 27 (“The founders
worried especially about the danger that a powerful executive might pose to the
system if power were derived from the role of popular leader. For most federalists,
‘demagogue’ and ‘popular leader’ were synonyms, and nearly all references to
popular leaders in their writings are pejorative.”).
8
See Ceaser, supra note 7, at 252 (explaining that the Framers sought to channel
presidential communication “away from informal popular orations and towards
more deliberative forms of rhetoric”).
9
See TULIS, supra note 6, at 56.
10
HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE
CONSTITUTION 105 (2015).
11
HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN AND THE POWER OF THE PRESS: THE WAR FOR PUBLIC
OPINION 518 (2014); see also TULIS, supra note 6, at 80 (“Some have suggested that
the rhetorical presidency might be a reflection of increased opportunity for popular
leadership (development of wire services, mass communications, etc.), rather than a
doctrinal change. Lincoln makes clear not only that he did not lack opportunity, but
that such opportunities were the problem. Hastily formed statements might engender
a course of policy that was unintended. Finally, Lincoln indicates that ‘silence’ will
enhance the persuasive power of those speeches that he does deliver.”).
7
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his contemporary observers as inappropriate.12 Indeed, the
House of Representatives’ (ultimately unsuccessful) articles of
impeachment show how deeply Johnson’s expressive choices
offended prevailing norms of presidential discourse, in that he
was alleged to have made:
with a loud voice certain intemperate,
inflammatory and scandalous harangues, and did
therein utter loud threats and bitter menaces as
well against Congress as the laws of the United
States . . . . Which said utterances, declarations,
threats, and harangues, highly censurable in any,
are peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in the
Chief Magistrate of the United States, by means
whereof Andrew Johnson has brought the high
office of the President of the United States into
contempt, ridicule, and disgrace, to the great
scandal of all good citizens. . . . 13
Presidents’ expressive choices changed dramatically in
the 20 century. Teddy Roosevelt started this shift with his
strategic decision to advocate for his policies directly to the
people rather than to Congress.14 Woodrow Wilson built on
this move by resuscitating the long-dormant presidential
tradition of delivering a State of the Union address to Congress
in person and by offering important policy statements directly
to the citizenry through public speeches.15 Newer
communicative technologies further enabled and emboldened
this turn, as Franklin D. Roosevelt “became the first master of
the electronic media” with fireside chats broadcast directly to
the public,16 and “Kennedy began the practice of live televised
press conferences [because he] wanted to control the news.”17
Professor Tulis summarizes this revolution in the norms of
presidential discourse: “Today it is taken for granted that
th

12

See TULIS, supra note 6, at 89 (“Nothing could be further from the founders’
intentions than for presidential power to depend upon the interplay of orator and
crowd. This interplay may or may not persuade the immediate audience, but the
effect of such activity upon the president’s office, upon his dignity, upon his future
ability to persuade, and upon the deliberative process as a whole is likely to be
deleterious.”).
13
Articles of Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG,
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/articles-of-impeachment-of-andrewjohnson (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
14
TULIS, supra note 6, at 4 (“The core of [Roosevelt’s] argument was that a change in
authorized practices was necessary to fulfill the purposes of the underlying founding
theory of governance.”).
15
Id. at 133.
16
See BRUFF, supra note 10, at 231.
17
Id. at 294.
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presidents have a duty constantly to defend themselves publicly,
to promote policy initiatives nationwide, and to inspirit the
population. And for many, this presidential ‘function’ is not
one duty among many, but rather the heart of the presidency—
its essential task.”18
More recently, President Trump’s expressive choices
provide novel departures from traditional norms in their
substance, tone, and means of delivery. Trump himself
celebrates his expressive innovations, innovations that some
find resonant and others repellent: “Trump argued over the
weekend that his outsized Twitter presence was part of a
calculated redefinition of the presidency: ‘My use of social
media
is
not
Presidential—it’s
MODERN
DAY
PRESIDENTIAL.’”19 As just one example, Trump is unusually
combative and eager to engage conflict, rather than defuse it,
with his speech—a choice that some attribute to his background
in entertainment, media, and reality TV where the norms of
discourse are very different from those of traditional politics.20
But presidents are neither the only, nor necessarily the
most important of, government speakers. Governmental
agencies, for example, are now major expressive players—a
development initially inspired in large part by the urgencies of
war and implemented by the federal Committee on Public
Information, which relied on press releases, movies and
newsreels, posters, traveling exhibits, speeches, books, and
pamphlets to mobilize public support for the nation’s World
War I efforts.21 The growth of the administrative state fueled
the continued expansion of agencies’ expression. New Deal
agencies’ speech, for example, celebrated the work of the
Civilian Conservation Corps and explained the terms of the
newly enacted Social Security insurance program.22 Federal,
state, and local government agencies’ speech is now ubiquitous,
with examples that include not only the Surgeon General’s
report on the dangers of tobacco, but also the Forest Service’s
18

TULIS, supra note 6, at 4.
Jill Colvin, Twitter Battle with Press May Come with a Price, AP NEWS (July 3, 2017)
https://apnews.com/f3838ea7b4c645fb85b61303740cad86.
20
See Daniel W. Drezner, Why is Donald Trump so Bad at the Bully Pulpit?, WASH.
POST. (Aug. 14, 2017),
http://wapo.st/2w4qic3?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.2a1de22eb270.
21
See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 46–47 (1922) (describing the Committee
on Public Information as undertaking “the largest and most intensive effort to carry
quickly a fairly uniform set of ideas to all the people of the nation”).
22
JAMES C. MCCAMY, GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY 23, 39 (1939); see also id. at 227
(“This expansion [in the administrative state] brought an attendant need for more
explanation of the [government’s new] program and more attention to the possible
public reaction to administrative practices. Likewise, as more of the public became
involved in any way with the new program, more demands for information were
created.”).
19
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Smokey Bear wildfire prevention campaign; health alerts from
the Center for Disease Control; disaster preparedness warnings
from emergency management offices; and many more.
Legislatures also engage in a variety of expressive
endeavors. Through resolutions, legislative bodies articulate
their views on a particular topic. For instance, “in response to
the outbreak of noose incidents in 2007, the entire United States
federal legislature voiced its disapprobation. In December of
that year, both the House and the Senate passed resolutions
citing the history of lynching in America” and condemning the
intimidating displays of nooses.23 Committee reports and
related oversight activities also communicate the legislature’s
priorities and values.24 As Josh Chafetz explains, “holding
hearings and releasing information to the press and the public is
an essential means by which houses and members make
arguments in the public sphere and attempt to shape the public
discourse.”25
The judiciary speaks too. Not only does its power of the
pen include the power to write opinions (including
concurrences and dissents), but the judiciary also speaks in
other settings to other governmental actors and to the public.26
To be sure, the judiciary’s expressive norms vary from those of
other government speakers in their greater tendency toward
formality and deliberation; relatedly, judges (and government
lawyers) are unlike other government speakers in that their
speech is constrained by ethics codes that prohibit falsehoods,27
ex parte communications,28 certain commentary on pending
matters,29 and sometimes their campaign speech.30 Indeed,
judges’ politically expressive efforts met with outcry and
opposition very early on: recall that Supreme Court Justice and
Federalist party member Samuel Chase faced impeachment
proceedings for his expressive use of grand jury charges to
23

Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.,
1115, 1146 (2010).
24
See, e.g., Note, Blacklisting Through the Official Publication of Congressional Reports, 81
YALE. L.J. 188 (1971) (discussing the expressive use of congressional reports to
shame targeted individuals).
25
JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 152 (2017); see also id. at 38 (“[C]ongressional committees
can drive the national agenda by holding hearings that draw attention to certain
issues, and ‘entrepreneurial’ individual members of Congress, using the platform
afforded by their offices (and, if necessary the protection afforded by the Speech or
Debate Clause . . . ), can play key roles in shaping the national discussion.”).
26
See generally RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND THE MEDIA (2011).
27
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
28
Id. at r. 2.9.
29
Id. at r. 2.10.
30
Id. at r. 4.1.
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attack the Republican party and its policies.31 Over time,
however, some judicial speakers have shown increasing
willingness to engage in public policy debates. Recall, for
example, Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes’ letter to the
Senate Judiciary Committee refuting FDR’s claims that the
nine-Justice Court was struggling to handle its workload—a
letter many considered to be key in cohering opposition to the
president’s Court-packing proposal.32 More recent illustrations
include judges’ growing efforts to educate the public about the
judiciary as an institution, and to engage debates about
competing approaches to constitutional interpretation.33 Indeed,
some judges now employ social media for these purposes.34
In short, the history of government speech is as long as
the history of governments; a history that reveals myriad
changes and variations in the substance, tone, and delivery of
the government’s chosen messages. In contrast, the Supreme
Court’s government speech doctrine is relatively new. This
doctrine permits the government to assert a privilege to control
its own speech when defending Free Speech Clause challenges
by private parties claiming a constitutional right to shut down
the government’s expression. As the Court explained:
When a government entity embarks on a course
of action, it necessarily takes a particular
viewpoint and rejects others. The Free Speech
Clause does not require government to maintain
viewpoint neutrality when its officers and
employees speak about that venture. Here is a
simple example. During the Second World War,
31

See Lynn H. Rambo, When Should the First Amendment Protect Judges From Their
Unethical Speech? 5 (Tex. A&M Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 17–56, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3027761 (“Chase’s
impeachment (and near conviction) seems to have persuaded the judiciary that its
grand jury charges, and other judicial appearances, should no longer include overtly
political speeches.”).
32
See Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 488–92 (1937) (statement of Senator Burton K. Wheeler)
(reading from Chief Justice Hughes’s letter: “An increase in the number of justices of
the Supreme Court, apart from any question of policy, which I do not discuss, would
not promote the efficiency of the Court. It is believed that it would impair that
efficiency so long as the Court acts as a unit. There would be more judges to hear,
more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to be convinced and to
decide. The present number of justices is thought to be large enough so far as the
prompt, adequate, and efficient conduct of the work of the Court is concerned.”).
33
See DAVIS, supra note 26, at 184–85.
34
See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-Called Judge (S. Methodist
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 365, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3013241 (documenting some
judges’ use of social media to respond to other speakers’ attacks on judicial
legitimacy, to educate citizens about the legal system, and to address proposals for
changes to the legal system).
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the Federal Government produced and
distributed millions of posters to promote the war
effort. There were posters urging enlistment, the
purchase of war bonds, and the conservation of
scarce resources. These posters expressed a
viewpoint, but the First Amendment did not
demand that the Government balance the
message of these posters by producing and
distributing posters encouraging Americans to
refrain from engaging in these activities.35
The government speech doctrine thus explains why tobacco
companies do not have a First Amendment right to force the
Surgeon General to deliver their views on the benefits of
cigarettes, and why the Administration’s political critics do not
have a First Amendment right to share the podium at the
President’s State of the Union address. Instead, the First
Amendment protects those dissenting speakers’ right to present
their own views in their own reports and at their own press
conferences.
The Court’s government speech doctrine appropriately
recognizes the value—and, indeed, the inevitability—of the
government’s expressive choices.36 I believe, however, that its
doctrine remains incomplete in at least two respects. First, the
Court to date has failed to insist that the government
affirmatively identify itself as the source of expression as a
condition of claiming the government speech defense, even
though meaningful political accountability requires such
transparency.37 Second, the Court has yet to grapple with the
ways in which the government’s speech sometimes
affirmatively threatens specific constitutional values (apart from
whether and when the government’s religious speech violates
the Establishment Clause). By failing to address these issues,
the Court has missed opportunities to check the government’s
destructive expressive choices, including the government’s
expressive efforts to manufacture doubt.
To be sure, the government’s expressive choices are
neither inevitably good nor bad. Through its speech, the
government can educate, shame, empower, challenge, distress,
comfort, or distract. While this Essay focuses primarily on a

35

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757–58 (2017).
See id. at 1758 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine as
“important—indeed, essential”).
37
See Helen Norton, Government Speech and Political Courage, 68 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 61, 66 (2015).
36
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dark side of the government’s expression,38 the government’s
speech can, and often does, serve important constitutional
values. For example, presidents' expressive use of their bully
pulpit to advocate for everything from tax reform to child
nutrition can generate important public conversations and
inform the public's political choices. Through its speech, the
government can also assert moral and political leadership in the
nation’s ongoing struggle to achieve equality. Recall, for
example, President Lyndon Johnson’s nationally televised
presidential exhortation that "We Shall Overcome" in the midst
of the 1960s’ civil rights battles,39 President George W. Bush’s
repudiation of anti-Muslim bigotry in a speech at a mosque
immediately after the 9/11 attacks,40 and, more recently, New
Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu’s explanation of his city’s
expressive choice to remove its Confederate monuments from
public property.41
But the government’s speech sometimes excludes and
divides in ways repugnant to equal protection values, as
illustrated by the lies told by governmental officials to justify
the World War II internment of thousands of JapaneseAmerican citizens.42 As another example, in the aftermath of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
many Southern governors and members of Congress, along
with other state and local officials, engaged in an expressive
campaign of “massive resistance” to undermine the Court’s
credibility and legitimacy. 43 For instance, at his inauguration as
38

See Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1991) (“The landmarks by
which we guide ourselves in constitutional law are usually not positive ideals but the
dangers we have identified and seek to avoid.”).
39
President Lyndon B. Johnson, “We Shall Overcome” Speech to Congress, (Mar.
15, 1965) (transcript available at
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/Symposia/Symposia%20
2011-2012/Johnson_WeShallOvercome.pdf).
40
President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17, 2001) (transcript available at https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html). For related
examples, see Helen Norton, Government Speech and the War on Terror, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 543, 545–46 (2017).
41
See Katherine Sayers, Read Mayor Mitch Landrieu’s Speech on Removing New Orleans’s
Confederate Monuments, NOLA (May 22, 2017, 2:18 PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/mayor_landrieu_speech_confede
r.html (“Surely we are far enough removed from this dark time to acknowledge that
the cause of the Confederacy was wrong.”).
42
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235–40 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (describing the government’s many lies); Korematsu v. United States, 584
F. Supp. 1406, 1418–22 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (describing evidence of the government’s
lies in earlier proceedings). For additional examples, see Norton, supra note 40, at
547–52.
43
See BARTLEY, supra note 5, at 117 (describing the objective of the Southern
manifesto as to “confuse legal and moral issues and to undermine any sense of
inevitability a Supreme Court decision normally commands”).
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governor of Alabama, George Wallace climbed the state
capitol’s steps to declare:
Today I have stood, where once Jefferson Davis
stood, and took an oath to my people. It is very
appropriate then that from this Cradle of the
Confederacy, this very Heart of the Great AngloSaxon Southland, that today we sound the drum
for freedom as have our generations of forebears
before us done, time and time again through
history. Let us rise to the call of freedom-loving
blood that is in us and send our answer to the
tyranny that clanks its chains upon the South. In
the name of the greatest people that have ever
trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and
toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny . . .
and I say . . . segregation today . . . segregation
tomorrow . . . segregation forever.44
(As an example of governmental counterspeech, contrast
Jimmy Carter’s inaugural address as Georgia’s governor just
eight years later: “The time for racial discrimination is over.”45)
The government’s expressive choices have undermined equality
in other ways as well. At around the same time as the campaign
for massive resistance, for example, a Senate subcommittee
charged with investigating “The Employment of Homosexuals
and Other Sex Perverts in Government” asserted that “[o]ne
homosexual can pollute a Government office.”46 More recently,
numerous state laws insist that public schools’ sex education
curricula include anti-gay expression; Alabama, for example,
requires “[a]n emphasis, in a factual manner and from a public

44

George Wallace, Former Governor of Alabama, Inaugural Address (1963) (Jan.
14, 1963) (transcript available at
https://web.utk.edu/~mfitzge1/docs/374/wallace_seg63.pdf).
45
Jimmy Carter, Former Governor of Georgia, Inaugural Address (Jan. 12, 1971)
(transcript available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20161201224225/https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.go
v/documents/inaugural_address.pdf).
46
S. REP. NO. 81–241, at 4 (1950); see also id. (“[I]t is generally believed that those
who engage in overt acts of perversion lack the emotional stability of normal
persons. In addition there is an abundance of evidence to sustain the conclusion that
indulgence in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber of an individual to a
degree that he is not suitable for a position of responsibility. Most of the authorities
agree and our investigation has shown that the presence of a sex pervert in a
Government agency tends to have a corrosive influence upon his fellow employees.
These perverts will frequently attempt to entice normal individuals to engage in
perverted practices. . . .”).
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health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle
acceptable to the general public.”47
The government’s speech can frustrate other
constitutional values too. In the next Part, I draw from both
historical and contemporary examples to identify ways in
which the government’s expressive choices may manufacture
doubt and distort the truth.
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S CAPACITY TO MANUFACTURE DOUBT
THROUGH ITS EXPRESSIVE CHOICES
The government is unusually well-positioned to
manufacture doubt through its expressive choices because it
generally enjoys advantages of power and information over its
listeners.48 Not only does the government exert coercive power
over the public as sovereign, but it also speaks in a number of
other roles in which it asserts power over its audience in various
ways—for example, as employer, educator, property owner,
and more. Indeed, the government sometimes holds its listeners
“captive”—i.e., with limited possibilities for voice or exit49—as
is the case of those in government custody, young people in
public schools, and patients in certain public health care
settings.50 The government’s often-privileged access to key
information further empowers its ability to manufacture doubt
about certain matters.51
47

ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (1975); see also Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay Curriculum
Laws, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (2017) (describing a variety of state laws regulating
public school teaching and curricula).
48
The government’s observers and critics have long objected to its efforts to exploit
these advantages to “weaponize” its speech. See, e.g., News as a Weapon, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Nov. 2, 1962, at 16 (criticizing the Kennedy Administration’s “admitted effort
to convert news of government into a propaganda weapon”).
49
See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (explaining that individuals
can change organizational behavior through voice (i.e., counterspeech objecting to
the group’s behavior) or exit (i.e., demonstrating their unhappiness by leaving the
group altogether).
50
See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 699 (1970)
(expressing concern about the government’s speech addressed to a captive audience
and other “government expression that monopolizes or otherwise distorts the system
of freedom of expression”).
51
See LIPPMANN, supra note 21, at 247 (“The established leaders of any organization
have great natural advantages. They are believed to have better sources of
information. The books and papers are in their offices. They took part in the
important conferences. They met the important people. They have responsibility. It
is, therefore, easier for them to secure attention and to speak in a convincing tone.
But also they have a very great deal of control over the access to the facts. Every
official is in some degree a censor.”); David Pozen, The Rhetorical Presidency Meets the
Drone Presidency (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14–484, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= (“The Obama
administration’s speeches are admirably low on demagoguery. Yet like all
governmental presentations in public venues, they have a tendency to obscure or
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The government’s ability to manufacture doubt through
its expressive choices is greater still because its identity and
substantial resources enable it, relatively easily, to attract the
attention of a large audience.52 Newer expressive technologies
enhance these opportunities by empowering the government to
reach its listeners immediately and without intermediation from
the press or other skeptical third parties. During the Obama
Administration, for example, the White House’s Office of
Digital Services increasingly chose to break presidential news
directly to the public through Obama’s social media accounts
rather than wait for traditional print media to do so.53 That
office also relied on analytics to “track what United States
senators and the people who worked for them, and influenced
them, were seeing online—and make sure that no potential
negative comment passed without a tweet.”54 To be sure, the
government’s reliance on such technologies can facilitate
democratic accountability, free expression, and related
constitutional interests by expanding public access to
government information and enabling citizens’ participation in
governmental processes.55 On the other hand, some expressive
technologies can also mask the government’s authorship of,

omit significant facts, complications, and objections, a tendency that is exacerbated
in the national security field by the ready-made excuse of protecting classified
information.”).
52
See Jenna Johnson, This is What Happens When Donald Trump Attacks a Private
Citizen on Twitter, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/this-is-what-happens-when-donaldtrump-attacks-a-private-citizen-on-twitter/2016/12/08/a1380ece-bd62-11e6-91ee1adddfe36cbe_story.html?utm_term=.54f42bcc1b13 (“With one tweet, Trump can
change headlines on cable news, move financial markets or cause world leaders to
worry. With one tweet last week, Trump inflamed a conflict with China. With
another tweet on Tuesday, Trump caused Boeing stock to plummet. With a third on
Wednesday night, Trump prompted a series of threatening calls to the home of a
union leader who had called him a liar.”); see also Michael D. Shear, Trump as
Cyberbully in Chief? Twitter Attack on Union Boss Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/us/politics/donald-trump-twitter-carrierchuck-jones.html (“David Axelrod, who was a senior adviser to President Obama,
said he always advised the current occupant of the Oval Office to be mindful of the
extra power that his words carried once they were amplified by the most powerful
megaphone in the world. ‘What you may think is a light tap is a howitzer,’ Mr.
Axelrod said. ‘When you have the man in the most powerful office, for whom there
is no target too small, that is a chilling prospect. He has the ability to destroy people
in 140 characters.’”).
53
See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, A Digital Team Is Helping Obama Find His Voice Online,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/us/politics/adigital-team-is-helping-obama-find-his-voice-online.html.
54
David Samuels, The Storyteller and the President, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 8, 2016, at
MM44.
55
See Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. Of Supervisors, 227 F. Supp. 3d 605, 609 (E.D.
Va. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff had adequately alleged that a public official’s
Facebook page was a limited public forum for First Amendment purposes).
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and thus its political accountability for, various messages.56
Moreover, the ever-increasing speed and reach of the
government’s communication can exacerbate the harms of its
hateful or deceitful speech.57 Indeed, changes in the means by
which the government speaks can lead to changes in the
substance of its speech as well. For example, Twitter requires
brevity and rewards outrageousness; President Trump often
excels at both.58
The remainder of this Part explores three strategies
through which government sometimes exploits these power and
information advantages to manufacture doubt about factual
assertions that it perceives to be inconsistent with its policy or
partisan preferences: through its lies and misrepresentations,
through its attacks on individuals and institutions that challenge
its preferred narrative, and through its choices to bury or deny
access to information that it finds inconvenient or dangerous.
To be sure, this is not an exhaustive list, nor are these strategies
mutually exclusive.
A. Lies and Misrepresentations
First, and perhaps most obviously, the government can
manufacture
doubt
through
its
lies and factual
59
misrepresentations.
As I have detailed elsewhere, the
56

See Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 899 (2010) (describing the government’s transparent and opaque uses of newer
expressive technologies).
57
See YUDOF, supra note 4, at 11 (“The political significance of technology lies in the
enhanced capacity of government officials to preserve their positions of power, to
gain support for themselves and their policies, and to dominate discussion of public
issues. Technology is ethically neutral, but unethical leaders seize upon it to advance
their interests.”).
58
See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy),
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 212 (2018) (“Trump is the first ‘Twitter president,’
not only in the volume of tweets that he sent out to his millions of followers but also
in their incendiary nature. Trump was able to attract free (traditional) media
attention through his social media program and communicate in ways that did not
depend upon political parties, journalists, or other intermediaries to filter his
message. And he was able to do so in short, angry bursts which would not be
possible if directly addressing voters in a weekly radio address or a speech from the
Oval Office. . . . Trump hurled insults and also used his Twitter account to spread
false claims, for instance, that there was massive voter fraud in the 2016 election. He
offered a variety of false, exaggerated, and incendiary claims many of which would
not have been spread as widely and in an unmediated way before the era of cheap
speech.”) (footnotes omitted).
59
See David Leonhardt, Ian Prasad Philbrick, & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Lies v.
Obama’s, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/14/opinion/sunday/trump-liesobama-who-is-worse.html (“We applied the same conservative standard to Obama
and Trump, counting only demonstrably and substantially false statements. The
result: Trump is unlike any other modern president. He seems virtually indifferent to
reality, often saying whatever helps him make the case he’s trying to make. . . . We
have used the word ‘lies’ again here, as we did in our original piece. If anything,
though, the word is unfair to Obama and Bush. When they became aware that they
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government’s lies can take many forms.60 For example, the
government’s lies and misrepresentations include those that
conceal itself as the source of a message to improve its
reception in situations where the public might otherwise doubt
the government's credibility.61 In terms of motive, the
government’s lies include those to avoid political
accountability, silence dissent, and manipulate public policy, as
well as those that seek to create skepticism and cynicism and
distrust more generally.62 The government can also
manufacture doubt through falsehoods that seek to divert and
distract the public from efforts to discover the truth. For
example, in response to growing concerns about his campaign’s
connections to Russia, President Trump claimed, without
evidence, that President Obama had wiretapped him during the
campaign;63 the Department of Justice later acknowledged that
no such evidence existed.64
B. Expressive Attacks on Critics and Dissenters
Next, the government can manufacture doubt by seeking
to silence or discredit those who speak about matters that
threaten the government’s perceived self-interest.65 These tactics
have a long pedigree. Queen Elizabeth forbade Parliament from
discussing who might succeed her to the throne,66 for example,

had been saying something untrue, they stopped doing it. . . . Trump is different.
When he is caught lying, he will often try to discredit people telling the truth, be they
judges, scientists, F.B.I. or C.I.A. officials, journalists or members of Congress.”).
60
Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73 (2015).
61
See Helen Norton, Government Lies and the Press Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2998909
(offering examples of the government’s lies that conceal itself as the source of
contested speech).
62
This strategy is far from new. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 100 (1967) (“[A]n essential part in the
pseudo-conservative world view is that our recent Presidents [FDR, Truman, and
Eisenhower], being men of wholly evil intent, have conspired against the public
good. This does more than discredit them: it calls into question the validity of the
political system that keeps putting such men into office.”).
63
See David Shepardson, Trump Claims Obama Wiretapped Him During Campaign;
Obama Refutes It, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2017, 8:05AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-obama/trump-claims-obamawiretapped-him-during-campaign-obama-refutes-it-idUSKBN16B0CC.
64
See Deirde Walsh, Justice Department: No Evidence Trump Tower was Wiretapped,
CNN (Sept. 3, 2017, 5:50PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/02/politics/justicedepartment-trump-tower-wiretap/index.html; Nina Burleigh, Trump’s Claim that
Obama Wiretapped His Campaign is False: U.S. Department of Justice, NEWSWEEK (Sept.
2, 2017 12:49 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-russia-investigation-wiretapfbi-obama-658888.
65
See EMERSON, supra note 50, at 699 (expressing concern about “government
expression used as a sanction against private expression”).
66
See CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 190, 245–46.
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and the antebellum House of Representatives forbade the
discussion of anti-slavery petitions on its floor.67
More specifically, through its speech, the government
can try to position itself as the authoritative source of
information by attacking those who contest its preferred
narrative.68 The government’s expressive attacks can be
particularly effective when its targets are limited in their ability
to engage in counterspeech—perhaps because they cannot
attract the same media and public attention, or where they are
politically or otherwise vulnerable.69 The government’s use of
social media and related expressive technologies that encourage
social and political polarization can additionally improve its
ability to discredit and undermine those who challenge its
preferred narrative.70
The targets of the government’s expressive attacks can
include institutions, like the press, the judiciary, or intelligence
agencies. Indeed, the government’s lies are even more likely to
succeed in deceiving the public if the government has already
undercut truth-seeking institutions’ ability to offer counternarratives.71 The government’s expressive targets can include
individuals: examples include the FBI's defamatory falsehoods
about the government’s critics to friends, family members,
67

See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1996).
68
See David Nakamura, John Wagner, & Aaron Gregg, President Trump Locks Heads
with News Media in a Social-Media First, WASH. POST (July 2, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/president-trump-locks-heads-with-newsmedia-in-a-social-media-first/2017/07/02/313e1dd6-5f40-11e7-84a1a26b75ad39fe_story.html (“Presidential historians suggested that Trump’s social
media attacks are lowering the bar on what constitutes appropriate presidential
conduct in fighting perceived media enemies.”); see also id. (quoting Trump: “The
fake media is trying to silence us, but we will not let them. The people know the
truth.”).
69
See Susan Collins, GOP Senator Susan Collins: Why I Cannot Support Trump, WASH.
POST (August 8, 2016), http://wpo.st/MpAr1. Recounting candidate Trump’s verbal
attacks on those who disagreed with him, including a reporter with disability, the
Gold Star parents of Muslim soldier, and a federal judge engaged in ongoing
litigation, Republican Senator Susan Collins concluded, “[I[t was his attacks directed
at people who could not respond on an equal footing—either because they do not
share his power or stature or because professional responsibility precluded them from
engaging at such a level—that revealed Mr. Trump as unworthy of being our
president.” Id.
70
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA 90 (2017) (“In the 2016 campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump showed
a keen working knowledge of social influences and group polarization, constantly
emphasizing how popular he was, and pointing constantly to the polls are
evidence.”).
71
See RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press
(Brigham Young Univ. Law Research Paper No. 17–23, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929708 (explaining that the
government sometimes engages in “enemy construction” in which it seeks to instill
or exacerbate public fear of certain individuals, communities, or institutions—like
the press, immigrants, or racial and religious minorities).
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employers, and the media during the 1950s and 1960s.72 The
government’s targets can include organizations: as Justice Black
explained during the Cold War era, “In the present climate of
public opinion it appears certain that the Attorney General’s
much publicized findings [that an organization should be
designated to be ‘subversive’], regardless of their truth or falsity
are the practical equivalents of confiscation and death sentences
for any blacklisted organization not possessing extraordinary
financial, political, religious prestige and influence.”73 The
government’s targets can include its own employees: indeed,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos74 empowered
the government to punish public employees who report the
government’s lies and other misconduct when it held that the
First Amendment does not protect public employees' speech
pursuant to their jobs.75
Legislatures as well as executive branch speakers can
manufacture doubt by attacking those who challenge the
government’s “truth.”76 Senator McCarthy, among others,
demonstrated how to capture media attention and partisan gain
through outrageous and often unfounded charges.77 Seth
72

See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 490 (2004).
The government sometimes urges private employers to punish governmental critics
for their speech. See David Nakamura, White House: ESPN’s Jemele Hill Should Be
Fired for Calling Trump a ‘White Supremacist’, WASH. POST. (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/13/whitehouse-espns-jemele-hill-should-be-fired-for-calling-trump-a-whitesupremacist/?utm_term=.90e752b39a80 (quoting White House press secretary Sarah
Huckabee Sanders as saying that a sportscaster’s Tweet describing Trump’s election
as “the direct result of white supremacy” was “certainly something that I think is a
fireable offense by ESPN”); Ken Belson and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Attacks
Warriors’ Curry. LeBron James’s Retort: ‘U Bum.’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2ykBBKX (quoting Trump as saying, “Wouldn’t you love to see
one of those N.F.L. owners, when somebody disrespects our flag, to say, ‘Get that
son of a bitch off the field right now, he’s fired.’”).
73
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142 (1951) (Black,
J., concurring).
74
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
75
Id. at 421. Lower courts have since applied Garcetti to reject the First Amendment
claims of numerous government workers who truthfully sought to expose
governmental misconduct. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech:
Government’s Efforts to Claim Its Workers Speech as Its Own, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 14–15
(2009) (listing examples).
76
See EMERSON, supra note 50, at 250–51 (“The resulting exposure, in which the
witness is cast in the role of a disloyal or even traitorous citizen, multiplies the effect
and extends it over an indefinite period of time. The witness may lose his job, even
his career; he may suffer other forms of economic reprisal, such as inability to obtain
insurance or a mortgage; he is subject to great social pressures, which operate also
against his entire family . . . . [The committee] conducted hearings in a manner that
tended to stimulate hysteria. It issued reports, with or without prior hearings, that
condemned certain conduct as disloyal. It functioned, in short, as a sort of modern
Inquisition, attempting to stamp out heresy in the nation.”).
77
See JAMES RESTON, DEADLINE: A MEMOIR 220 (1991) (“Even with a superb staff,
we were, I’m sorry to say, intimidated much of the time by the popularity of
McCarthy’s lies and his charges that his opponents were ‘soft on communism.’”); see
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Kreimer notes the power of the government’s speech in this
regard:
[T]he striking thing about the enterprise which
Senator McCarthy embodied was that it
achieved, strictly through the use of information,
a substantial impact on citizens’ lives, the
discourse of the republic, and the exercise of the
First Amendment rights of speech, belief, and
association . . . . The sanctions at the command
of Senator McCarthy, and his precursors and
imitators, were primarily the ability to obtain and
publish information . . . . The legacy of the
McCarthy era was illuminated by the potential
for private suppression manifest in the civil rights
struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. The two
combined to fix in the judicial consciousness the
destructive power of exposure as a sanction.
Courts have realized that words lead to sticks and
stones; both physical and social sanctions form
legal reality.78
The consequences of government speakers’ expressive
attacks included targets’ job loss, property destruction, physical
violence, and even loss of life. Many of these stories are wellknown, some less so. For example, shortly after Senators
associated with McCarthy’s efforts threatened to disclose that
Wyoming Senator Lester Hunt’s son had been arrested for
soliciting a male police officer, Senator Hunt shot himself in his
Capitol Hill office.79 And the day after the Attorney General
announced in 1966 that he would seek to require the W.E.B.
Dubois Club to register as a communist front organization, the
club’s San Francisco office was bombed and its Brooklyn office
attacked by a mob.80

also id. at 216 (“His charges may not have made sense, but they made headlines and
they sold a lot of papers. McCarthy knew how to take advantage of this ‘cult of
objectivity.’ He made the front pages by announcing his discovery one day and
embellishing it a few days later, and each time he still hit the front pages.”).
78
Kreimer, supra note 38, at 21, 28–29.
79
See Drew Pearson, Washington Merry-Go-Round, MADERA DAILY NEWS-TRIB.
(Cal.), June 23, 1954, at 9 (describing the incident as “one of the lowest types of
political pressure this writer has seen in many years” and an example of “the new
technique used by McCarthyites to pressure other senators”).
80
See Ted Finman & Stewart Macauley, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and
the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 632, 633 (1966).
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C. Information Control
The government can also manufacture doubt through its
control of information. Here too its options are many and
varied. A democratic government ideally makes expressive
choices through which it shares information and encourages
counterspeech.81 But the government sometimes instead
manufactures doubt by depriving the public of access to key
information.82 As Mark Yudof observed, “government
expression and secrecy can sometimes” be the functional
equivalent of censorship.83 Secrecy, in turn, breeds further
doubt.84
The government can control information not only
through secret-keeping and selective disclosures,85 but also by
abandoning efforts to collect or report factual information and
by refusing to make its experts available for public discussion.86
For instance, Robert Lopresti recounts that in 2004 the Bureau
81

See Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“Authoritarian information states are information gluttons,
information misers, and information monopolists. They try to collect as much
information as they can, but they do not share it with their people. They try to
monopolize control over information in order to serve the interests of those in power.
Democratic information states, by contrast, are information gourmets, information
philanthropists, and information decentralizers.”).
82
See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
881, 885 (2008) (describing the dangers of certain government secrets). Mary Graham
recounts that governmental norms of secrecy, like those of affirmative discourse,
have also changed with time and leadership. For example, George Washington tried
to champion a culture of openness, while Woodrow Wilson sought “new levels of
government secrecy.” MARY GRAHAM, PRESIDENTS’ SECRETS: THE USE AND ABUSE
OF HIDDEN POWER 48–49, 78–79 (2017).
83
YUDOF, supra note 4, at 158.
84
See Richard G. Powers, Introduction to DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 19 (1998) (“McCarthyism would probably have been
impossible except for the claim that official secrecy was keeping the American people
from the truth about Communists.”); see also id. at 58 (“What secrecy grants in the
short run — public support for government policies — in the long run it takes away,
as official secrecy gives rise to fantasies that corrode belief in the possibilities of
democratic government.”).
85
For example, the government can leak information strategically and selectively in
ways that support its preferred narrative. See generally David E. Pozen, The Leaky
Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of
Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). My thanks to Joseph Blocher for
suggesting this connection.
86
See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, EPA Yanks Scientists’ Conference Presentation,
Including on Climate Change, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/epa-yanks-scientistspresentations-at-conference-on-narragansett-bay/2017/10/22/7429e65c-b76a-11e7a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.9321d2d484df (reporting that the EPA
“instructed two of its scientists and one contractor not to speak as planned at a
scientific conference” on the climate change challenges affecting Narragansett Bay);
but see Lisa Friedman, Scott Pruitt, E.P.A. Chief, Says Agency Scientists Are Free to Discuss
Their Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/climate/scott-pruitt-epa.html (quoting EPA
head Scott Pruitt as saying that “[p]rocedures have been put in place to prevent such
an occurrence in the future”).
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of Labor Statistics “became involved in a controversy related to
what some interpreted as a deliberate attempt by George W.
Bush’s administration to conceal information of which it
disapproved. Specifically, the Bureau announced its plan to
make major changes in the Current Employment Statistics
(CES) survey” and to stop collecting separate data by sex in
major industries.87 Lopresti characterizes these decisions as
contributing to the government’s longstanding underestimation
of women’s role in the American workforce.88 More recent
illustrations include the Trump Administration’s decision to
remove scientific information about climate change from
federal agencies’ websites such that some estimate that it has
cut available public data sets by 25 percent.89 Legislatures can
similarly choose to deprive the public of information that might
threaten a preferred factual narrative; for example, “[a]t the
request of the National Rifle Association, Congress forbade the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from gathering
statistics on gun violence.”90
The government can also hide, and thus dilute the
power of, counterspeech by burying it in other government
speech. For example, Julie Cohen describes “infoglut” as a way
in which the government (and other speakers) can create
confusion and undermine certainty by overloading the public
with speech:
The political and epistemological dilemmas of
infoglut flow instead from abundance [rather
than scarcity]. Techniques of critique and
deconstruction increasingly become tools of the
powerful, and sophisticated appeals to emotion
and ingrained instinct readily overshadow
reasoned argument. For example, “the rejoinder
to critique is not the attempt to reassert a counternarrative about, say, the scientific consensus
around global warning, but to cast doubt on any
87

ROBERT LOPRESTI, WHEN WOMEN DIDN’T COUNT: THE CHRONIC MISMEASURE
AND MARGINALIZATION OF AMERICAN WOMEN IN FEDERAL STATISTICS 102 (2017).
88

Id. at 252 (“This book contains multiple examples, over many decades, of
government authors expressing astonishment that so many women were working for
a living.”).
89
See Juliet Eilperin, Under Trump, Inconvenient Data is Being Sidelined, WASH. POST
(May 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/under-trumpinconvenient-data-is-being-sidelined/2017/05/14/3ae22c28-3106-11e7-8674437ddb6e813e_story.html?utm_term=.56f9b71efcfa; see also Susan Nevelow Mart,
Disappearing Government Information and the Internet's Public Domain, 36 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS 5, 7 (2011) (describing the government’s removal of information from
public websites and the concerns that arise when we don’t know what was removed
as well as what is no longer being reported).
90
LOPRESTI, supra note 87, at 3–4.
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narrative’s attempt to claim dominance: all socalled experts are biased, any account partial, all
conclusions that result of an arbitrary and
premature closure of the debate.” Information
abundance also enables new types of power
asymmetries that revolve around differential
access to data and to the ability to capture, store,
and process it on a massive scale.91
Finally, the government can manufacture doubt by
resisting oversight that might otherwise produce information
that could challenge its preferred narrative—that is, by refusing
to engage in dialogue with other government speakers.92 The
government can achieve similar results by limiting access to the
results of such oversight.93
III. WHAT NEXT?
As the preceding Part explained, a variety of expressive
strategies enable the government to manufacture doubt to
protect its own interest at the expense of the public’s. This
problem is a tough nut indeed, and I do not pretend to crack it
here.94 Instead, I seek to invite additional thinking and
discussion.

91

Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 369, 384 (2016).
92
See Burgess Everett & Josh Dawsey, White House Orders Agencies to Ignore Democrats’
Oversight Requests; Trump’s Aides are Trying to Shut Down the Release of Information that
Could be Used to Attack the President, POLITICO, (June 2, 2017, 5:11 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/02/federal-agencies-oversight-requestsdemocrats-white-house-239034 (“The idea, Republicans said, is to choke off the
Democratic congressional minorities from gaining new information that could be
used to attack the president.”).
93
See Mark Mazzetti & Matthew Rosenberg, Trump Administration Returns Copies of
C.I.A. Torture Report to Congress, (June 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/us/politics/cia-torture-report-trump.html
(“Congressional officials said on Friday that the administration had begun returning
to Congress copies of a 6,700-page Senate report from 2014 about the C.I.A.
program. The move raises the possibility that most of the copies could be locked in
Senate vaults indefinitely or even destroyed—and increases the risk that future
government officials, unable to read the report, will never learn its lessons. . . . The
central conclusion of the report is that the spy agency’s interrogation methods—
including waterboarding, sleep deprivation and other kinds of torture—were far more
brutal and less effective than the C.I.A. described to policy makers, Congress and the
public.”).
94
See LIPPMANN, supra note 21, at 76 (“[T]he environment with which our public
opinions deal is refracted in many ways, by censorship and privacy at the source, by
physical and social barriers at the other end, by scanty attention, by the poverty of
language, by distraction, by unconscious constellations of feeling, by wear and tear,
violence, monotony. These limitations upon our access to that environment combine
with the obscurity and complexity of the facts themselves to thwart clearness and
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To start, we might draw from Lawrence Lessig’s
taxonomy of regulation and consider various responses that
take the form of markets, architecture, law, and norms.95 A
number of thoughtful commentators have started to discuss
how market-based approaches might encourage social media
platforms to address related challenges.96 And others have
begun to suggest various architectural solutions, such as nudges
to empower audiences’ ability to evaluate and counter
expressive pathologies both public and private.97
In terms of law, elsewhere I have discussed possible
doctrinal responses to the problems of government speech. For
example, we can understand government lies as a violation of
the Free Speech Clause when they are sufficiently coercive of
their targets’ beliefs or speech to constitute the functional
equivalent of the government’s direct regulation of that
expressive activity.98 Relatedly, the Court can adopt a more
justice of perception, to substitute misleading fictions for workable ideas, and to
deprive us of adequate checks upon those who consciously strive to mislead.”).
95
See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD . 661, 662–64
(1998) (describing how law, social norms, markets, and architecture all can regulate
human behavior in different ways). In other words, we need to think about law, but
not only about law.
96
See, e.g., Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 285-290 (2018) (recommending self-regulation by information intermediaries to
discourage the dissemination of fake news and to require disclosure of the source of
such communications); Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer, & Jane R. Bambauer,
Identifying and Countering Fake News (Ariz. Legal Stud. Discussion Paper No. 17–15,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007971 (suggesting
possibilities that include “creating new platforms that do not rely on online
advertising” and “encouraging existing platforms to experiment with technical
solutions to identify and flag fake news”).
97
See Levi, supra note 96 (urging greater investment in listeners’ information literacy);
see also JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED
BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 79–80 (2013) (“The main way that we change our minds
on moral issues is by interacting with other people. We are terrible at seeking
evidence that challenges our own beliefs, but other people do us this favor, just as we
are quite good at finding errors in other people’s beliefs. When discussions are
hostile, the odds of change are slight. The elephant leans away from the opponent,
and the rider works frantically to rebut the opponent’s charges. But if there is
affection, admiration, or a desire to please the other person, then the elephant leans
toward the person and the rider tries to find the truth in the other person’s
arguments.”); id. at 105 (“[E]ach individual reasoner is really good at one thing:
finding evidence to support the position he or she already holds, usually for intuitive
reasons. We should not expect individuals to produce good, open-minded, truthseeking reasoning, particularly when self-interest or reputational concerns are in
play. But if you put individuals together in the right way, such that some individuals
can use their reasoning powers to disconfirm the claims of others, and all individuals
feel some common bond or shared fate that allows them to act civilly, you can create
a group that ends up producing good reasoning as an emergent property of the social
system.”).
98
See Norton, supra note 60, at 100–07. Examples include the government’s lies to or
about its critics intended to deter or otherwise retaliate against them for their speech
(through, for example, false threats about legal consequences or lies that inflict
reputational or economic injury), or the government’s lies to captive or otherwise
vulnerable audiences intended to manipulate their expressive choices. Id.
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muscular Press Clause doctrine to empower the press to check
the government’s destructive expressive choices.99 Moreover, to
enable greater transparency and accountability, the Court
should refine its government speech doctrine to require that the
government identify itself as the source of a message as a
condition of claiming the government speech defense to Free
Speech Clause challenges.100 Legislatures can enact statutory
responses to the government’s expressive manufacture of doubt
requiring the government to make certain affirmative
disclosures and to otherwise constrain its lies and
misrepresentations, and enforcement officials can more
vigorously enforce existing laws that prohibit government
agencies from engaging in covert propaganda or that require the
government to make certain information public.101
But as Thomas Emerson observed, “[T]he judicial
structure is not capable, by itself, of fully protecting in practice
the theoretical rights guaranteed under our system of freedom
of expression. Full realization of those rights must depend
ultimately upon attitudes ingrained in the public mind and
support extended by the body politic as a whole.”102 This reality
invites a turn to norms as an additional source of constraint on
the government’s destructive expressive choices.
Robert McAdams explains that “norms” refer “to
informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to
follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a
fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”103 Norms can
effectively constrain behavior when those who violate them pay
99

See Levi, supra note 96 (urging that the Court revitalize press freedoms); Norton,
supra note 61 (proposing that we “understand the Press Clause to protect certain
negative rights by prohibiting press-related lies by the government that undermine the
press’s watchdog and educator functions. For example, governmental lies of
misappropriation—that is, its lies about being the press—can blur the line between
the government and the press in the public’s mind in ways that undermine public
trust in the independence of the press and thus damage the effectiveness of its newsgathering functions. The government's lies of misattribution—i.e., its lies about not
being the press—can similarly interfere with Press Clause functions by misleading
the public about the source of press publications in ways that not only threaten to
skew the public's decision-making, but also breach the public's trust in the press.”).
100
See Norton, supra note 37.
101
See Norton, supra note 40, at 560–61 (discussing possible statutory and
enforcement responses); Norton, supra note 60, at 108–13 (discussing same); Norton,
supra note 61 (discussing same).
102
Thomas Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1007
(1968); see also id. (“There is no effective legal remedy for much of [the government’s
harassment of political dissenters through its own speech]. Statements of public
officials or warnings of investigation, for instance, are not subject to judicial redress.
Nor is it possible to obtain court review of most activities of legislative committees,
apart from citations for contempt. . . .”); Norton, supra note 60, at 10–11 (describing
limitations of legal responses to the government’s constitutionally harmful speech).
103
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 340 (1997).

2018]

MANUFACTURE OF DOUBT

364

a price for their choice. Counterspeech can thus shape norms
through, for example, praise and criticism, and attendant
reputational and political rewards and punishment.104 To these
ends,
governmental
and
nongovernmental
actors’
counterspeech can enforce constructive norms of public
discourse by challenging the government’s lies and
misrepresentations, its expressive attacks on truth-seeking
individuals and institutions, and other destructive expressive
choices.105 Private and public counterspeakers’ tools for
enforcing norms of governmental discourse include not only
voice but also exit—i.e., their noisy withdrawal.106
Note that law can sometimes support and embolden
counterspeakers’ ability to enforce such norms.107 For example,
Josh Chafetz explains how the protections of the Speech or
Debate Clause at times enabled crucial disclosures by members
of Congress in the face of executive branch secrecy and lies. As
an illustration, Senator Mike Gravel read portions of the

104

See Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed (Aug. 22, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3025749)
(“Norm entrepreneurs draw attention to what they see as the stupidity,
unnaturalness, or ugliness of current norms . . . .”).
105
See Finman & Macaulay, supra note 80, at 696–97 (suggesting that government
speakers “should behave in a manner calculated to promote rationality rather than
error;” should exercise “more than ordinary care” to avoid misstatements; and
should couple “criticism of dissent with a reminder that protest and dissent are a vital
part of the American tradition.”); see also Lawrence Summers, After 75 Years of
Progress, Was Last Week a Hinge in History?, WASH. POST (June 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-75-years-of-progress-was-lastweek-a-hinge-in-history/2017/06/04/2085b91e-47cf-11e7-bcde624ad94170ab_story.html?utm_term=.e2943d576b75 (“It is essential that leaders in
U.S. society signal clearly their disapproval of the course the administration is
taking. . . . The more that leading figures in U.S. society can signal their continuing
commitment to reason, to common purpose with other nations, and to addressing
global challenges, the more the damage can be contained.”); Naureen Shah, What
U.S. Muslims fear from Trump, WASH. POST. (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gen-kelly-has-talked-about-humanrights-will-trump-listen/2016/12/30/ebabbcea-c928-11e6-bf4b2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.1cd0bfaa41d2 (“Dialogue and decency: In
today’s hyper-polarized political climate, these are as rare as unicorns.”).
106
See Powers, supra note 84, at 3 (describing Senator Moynihan’s resignation from
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in response to then-CIA Director
William Casey’s lies about the mining of Nicaraguan harbors during the Iran-Contra
affair; Moynihan returned to the Committee when Casey apologized); Jena
McGregor, Trump Fires Back After the CEO of Merck Resigned From His Manufacturing
Council, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/onleadership/wp/2017/08/14/trump-fires-back-after-the-ceo-of-merck-resigned-fromhis-manufacturing-council/ (quoting Merck CEO Kenneth C. Frazier’s resignation
from Trump’s American Manufacturing Council “as a matter of personal
conscience” because “America’s leaders must honor our fundamental values by
clearly rejecting expressions of hatred, bigotry, and group supremacy”).
107
See Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law:
A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 564 (1998) (“[N]orms and laws are substitutes
and complements, and sometimes norms are sources or even targets of law. . . .”).
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Pentagon Papers on the Senate floor.108 More recently, Senators
Wyden and Udall “announced on the Senate floor that the
Obama administration had adopted a secret, implausible
interpretation” of federal domestic surveillance law; this
disclosure, in turn, led to further investigations and further
disclosures by public and private actors alike.109 Indeed,
federalism and separation of powers principles offer structural
opportunities and incentives for counterspeech by some
governmental actors.110
Finally, the government’s own workforce is another
precious source of counterspeech challenging governmental
efforts to manufacture doubt.111 Sometimes this counterspeech
takes the form of government workers’ public protests,
sometimes their internal resistance, and sometimes their more
innovative forms of counterspeech. For example, in response to
the Trump Administration’s takedown of climate change data
from government websites, some National Park Service
employees created a new Twitter feed, @AltNatParkSer, to
repost key information. 112
As puny as these efforts to challenge the government’s
manufacture of doubt may sometimes feel, the alternative—
doing nothing—is doomed to failure. McCarthy—to name a
particularly notorious government speaker—defied the norms
of governmental discourse of his time, yet lasted nearly six
years, at least in part due to the acquiescence of governmental
and nongovernmental actors alike.113 As Kathleen Hall
108

See CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 216.
Id. at 221.
110
See YUDOF, supra note 4, at 47 (“The greatest threat of government domination
and distortion of majoritarian processes emanates from executive bodies and officers.
The greatest hope of restraining that power lies with the legislative branches of
government.”).
111
See Heidi Kitrosser, The Special Value of Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. REV.
301 (2015) (explaining how public employees’ speech can offer unique insights into
governmental workings).
112
See Abby Ohlheiser, A Running List of All the Possible Subtweets of President Trump
from Government Twitter Accounts, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/01/25/a-runninglist-of-all-the-possible-subtweets-of-president-trump-from-government-twitteraccounts/?utm_term=.9964bd35383c.
113
See RESTON, supra note 77, at 216–17 (“[M]ost news going to the papers and to the
radio and television stations was comparatively free of analysis or even explanation.
It was a sound enough theory and took into account everything but the arts of
political deception. For example, putting quotation marks around McCarthy’s false
charges did not relieve us of complicity in McCarthy’s campaign. Many newspapers
condemned him on their editorial pages but gave him plenty of space on the front
pages, which had more effect on public opinion. . . . [T]he trouble with
[Eisenhower’s] technique of judicious leaving-alone was that McCarthy destroyed a
lot of other people before Eisenhower finally had enough.”). Geof Stone recounts
that “[d]uring a speech on the [Senate] floor, McCarthy piled hundreds of documents
in front of himself, supposedly substantiating charges of Communist infiltration. He
defiantly dared any senator to inspect them.” Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the
109
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Jamieson recalls, “The demise of Joe McCarthy demonstrates
that a sustained form of rebuttal is required to dispel an
entrenched form of guilt by association.”114 In other words, we
can find no substitute for persistent pushback, on all fronts, to
the government’s efforts to manufacture doubt.115
IV. CONCLUSION
The government’s expressive choices can serve, or
instead threaten, deliberative democracy. At its best, the
government’s voice speaks truth to power both public and
private, and supports or amplifies the voices of the powerless.
But government is not always at its best. Our history and
continuing experience reveal a variety of ways in which the
government's expressive choices can manufacture doubt, distort
the truth, and frustrate key constitutional values. In this Essay,
I’ve sought to identify some of these patterns, both
longstanding and new, in hopes of helping to recognize and
challenge their deployment.
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